Third, because these Parties are ultimately
responsible for their populations, the matter
of identifying what can and should be done
by what deadline has been turned over to
each individual state because conditions are
unique to each of them. In addition, while acknowledging that assisting victims is a longterm task, a timeline has been established
for the achievement of a meaningful level of
interim progress: the Ottawa Convention’s
Second Review Conference in 2009.

Successful Implementation
of Protocol V
Protocol V of the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons1
recently

entered

into

force,

and the author hopes lessons
learned from the operations of
the Ottawa Convention2 can be
applied to this Protocol.
GRAPHIC COURTESY OF MAIC

by Kerry Brinkert [ Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining ]

O

n 12 November 2006, Protocol V of the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons entered into force; it addresses the humanitarian impact of explosive remnants of
war other than landmines.3 This “Protocol on Explosive Remnants
of War,” as it is formally known, contains “remedial measures of a
generic nature in order to minimise the risks and effects of explosive
remnants of war.”4 With the Protocol having become binding international law for more than 20 states,5 attention has turned toward the
work necessary to implement it.
Much of this attention has focused on practical operations of the
Protocol. For instance, it has been frequently mentioned that various lessons from the operations of the Ottawa Convention (e.g., an
informal work programme, a sponsorship programme) could be
applied to Protocol V. While valuable operational lessons can be
applied in terms of how the Protocol functions, what is often overlooked are the important conceptual lessons that can be applied from
the Ottawa Convention regarding what might be implemented.
Lessons Learned from the Ottawa Convention
Some central concepts in the work to implement the Ottawa
Convention are:
• Responsibility: It is the responsibility of each individual party
to the Convention to fulfill certain obligations in areas under
its control or jurisdiction.
• Measurable and time-bound obligations: Key provisions of
the Convention call for actions that are clearly quantified and
must be carried out over a set period of time.
• Cooperation and assistance: Notwithstanding the fact that
individual States Parties are responsible for fulfilling certain
measurable and time-bound obligations, other States Parties
are required to assist when feasible and to the extent possible.
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A complication exists, though, in instances when obligations are
not measurable and time-bound, or even universally applicable. In
such cases, it is difficult for cooperation and assistance to manifest
because objectives and deadlines are not clearly defined. A central
and active role of the state is exactly how the States Parties to the
Ottawa Convention have dealt with the ambiguity surrounding the
Convention’s obligations in relation to mine victims.
The imperative to assist mine victims is manifested in a legal
obligation for “each State Party in a position to do so” to “provide
assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration of mine victims.”6 However, unlike the Ottawa
Convention’s clear obligations to destroy or ensure the destruction
of stockpiled or emplaced anti-personnel mines, the obligation concerning mine-victim assistance is ambiguous. It is neither defined nor
measurable. Moreover, even if defined, the implementation of objectives and deadlines would not be universally applicable.
The Ottawa Convention’s States Parties have first dealt with the
ambiguity of mine-victim assistance by clearly defining mine victims
and victim assistance, and adopting certain common understandings
regarding the place of victim assistance in broader contexts.
Second, a number of States Parties have chosen to “self identify,”
an act of indicating that addressing the matter of victim assistance
is truly relevant and necessary for them. Certainly it is understood
all States Parties have a responsibility to support mine victims, no
matter the number of victims in a particular state. However, this
responsibility is particularly pertinent for those States Parties that
have indicated significant numbers—hundreds or thousands—of
survivors in areas under their control or jurisdiction. A total of 24
States Parties have self-identified, acknowledging that comparatively they have some of the greatest needs and greatest responsibilities
to provide victim assistance.

Applying these Lessons to Protocol V
Protocol V contains an obligation in
Article 8.2 to assist victims of explosive remnants of war that is basically identical to
the obligation in the Ottawa Convention.
Hence, the lessons of the Ottawa Convention
can easily be applied to the effort to implement victim assistance under Protocol V.
However, even beyond victim assistance, the
Ottawa Convention’s lessons can be applied
to Protocol V’s Article 3, which addresses the
clearance, removal or destruction of ERW.
Additionally, to ensure Protocol V has a more
immediate and noticeable impact, these lessons might also be applied to Article 7, which
contains an implicit appeal that clearance, removal or destruction measures be undertaken
with respect to already existing ERW.
Protocol V’s Article 3 calls for each High
Contracting Party to “mark and clear, remove or destroy explosive remnants of war
in affected territories under its control,”
according priority to those areas “posing
a serious humanitarian risk.” 7 Article 3 includes specifics regarding how these provisions should be applied, including surveying and assessing the threat; prioritising
needs; marking and clearing, removing or
destroying; conducting these activities in
accordance with high standards (left to the
reader to define); and mobilising resources
to carry out these activities.
However, despite these specific provisions, success or failure in the application of
Article 3 is not clear, measurable, time-bound
or universally applicable. Therefore, the
High Contracting Parties to Protocol V
may benefit from applying the Ottawa
Convention’s methodology for victim assistance, which was borne out of similar challenges in application. This methodology
could be applicable to Protocol V Articles 3
and 7 regarding clearance, removal and destruction of ERW, as well as to the victimassistance obligation found in Article 8.2,
and might include the following principles:
• States that wish to address the problems they face with respect to new
and existing ERW could be asked to
self-identify.

While Protocol V’s provisions largely relate to future ERW, clearance, removal and destruction of existing ERW as seen
here by a MACC Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team member carrying out a battle-area-clearance task, will be significant in ensuring the Protocol lives up to its promise.
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• As the responsibility to address problems caused by ERW rests with individual Parties that have self-identified,
these Parties could be asked—with
assistance if necessary—to provide
baseline information on the problems they face and to establish specific, measurable, achievable, relevant
objectives and timelines for achieving
these objectives.
• States could be asked to develop and
implement plans to achieve their objectives. As part of these plans, there
should be a clear articulation of priorities for assistance.
• High Contracting Parties in a position to provide assistance could respond to prioritised assistance needs
as articulated by Parties that have
well-developed plans.
• High Contracting Parties could
periodically hold Conferences of
High Contracting Parties to assess
progress in achieving the objectives
as previously articulated by the selfidentified Parties.
Conclusion
This approach may sound self-evident,
but such was not the case when similar
work to implement the Ottawa Convention
began. Moreover, there is an important
nuance to this methodology that places
the affected Party at the front and centre of addressing its Protocol V needs and
obligations. As such Parties hold ultimate
responsibility, notwithstanding the responsibility of others to assist, these affected

states should have their voices heard when
it comes to their needs and aspirations.
Equally, there should not be demands for
large-scale assistance until affected states
have also demonstrated a solid, realistic and
measurable plan for implementation.
See Endnotes, page 111

Since January 2002, Kerry Brinkert
has served as the Manager of the
Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining’s Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention
Implementation Support Unit. Prior to
that, Brinkert was the Section Head of
Research, Policy and Communications
with the Mine Action Team of
Canada’s Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade.

Kerry Brinkert
Manager, AP Mine Ban Convention    
   Implementation Support Unit
GICHD
7bis, Avenue de la Paix
P.O. Box 1300
1211 Geneva 1 / Switzerland
Tel: +41 22 906 16 37
Fax: +41 22 906 16 90
E-mail: k.brinkert@gichd.ch
Web site: http://www.gichd.ch

10.2 | winter 2006 | journal of mine action | focus | 49

